Chap. VIII.]
THE DUTIES OF FRIENDSHIP
259
the Marchioness de Lambert, “ be the tears and the silent sor-row of those who survive, and the most honorable sepulture be intheir hearts, we must not think that tears which are shed fromthe sensibility of the moment, and sometimes, too, from causes,which, in part at least, relate to ourselves, acquit us of all ourobligation. The name of our friends, their glory, their family,have still claims on our affection, which it would be guilt not tofeel. They should live still in our hearts, by the emotionswhich subsist there ; in our memory, by our frequent remem-brance of them ; in our voice, by our eulogiums; in our conduct,by an imitation of their virtues.”*
3. Abuses and violations of friendship. The great value offriendship, the resources of happiness which it opens to us, andthe benefits which it is fitted to confer on all who are qualified toperform its duties, appreciate its blessings, and yield to its kindlyinfluences, render some consideration of its abuses and violationsuseful. A complete enumeration of them, however, much lessany considerable illustration of them, cannot be attempted withinthe limits to which I am compelled to confine myself.
(1.) One abuse of friendship consists in the wish and attemptto monopolize the time, the attention, the affections, and theservices of friends. Juvenal, among other sarcasms which heinflicts on the Greeks, says it is their characteristic never to hesatisfied with a friend unless they can monopolize him.
“ Non est Romano cuiquam locus hie, ubi regnatQui, gentis vitio, nunquam partitur amicum ;
Solus habet.” t
There are persons whose friendship is of so exacting a kind,that they are unwilling to see a friend admitting any other to hisconfidence and intimacy. Such friendship is strongly tincturedwith selfishness, jealousy, and envy ; three of the worst passionswhich disgrace human nature.
(2.) Another abuse of friendship is, to consider it chiefly amatter of profit, and to enter into it with a principal view to thepersonal advantages, such as honor, wealth, or pleasure, which
* CEuvres, Tome I. p. 248; Brown’s Philosophy, Vol. III. p. 395, 396.f Sat. HI. 119-122.