DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

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comprised what we call experience and practical skill, more es-pecially the skill and presence of mind requisite to take measureswisely according to circumstances and emergences.* When allthe parts of our nature were in perfect concord with one another,when the passions never aimed at any gratification which reasondid not approve, and when reason never commanded any thingbut what these, of their own accord, were willing to perform ;this happy composure, this perfect and complete harmony ofsoul, constituted that virtue, which in the Latin language is ex-pressed by a term which we usually translate temperance, butwhich might more properly he translated equanimity, or sobrietyand moderation of mind.f

When the high-spirited passions, such as ambition, the love ofexcellence, the love of honor and the dread of shame, had thatdegree of strength and firmness, which enabled them, under thedirection of reason, to despise all dangers in the pursuit of whatwas honorable and noble ; it constituted the virtue of fortitude.JThe Stoics defined fortitude to consist in courage ( virtus ) con-tending on the side of justice.§ Justice, the last and greatestof the cardinal virtues, was seen, when each of the faculties ofthe mind confined itself to its proper office, without attemptingto encroach upon that of any other ; when reason directed andpassion obeyed ; and when each passion performed its properoffice, and exerted itself towards its proper object, easily andwithout reluctance, and with that degree of force and energy,which was suitable to the value of the object pursued. In thisconsisted that complete virtue, that perfect propriety of conduct,which Plato, after some of the ancient Pythagoreans, denomi-nated justice.||

In modern times, moral philosophy has usually been dividedaccording to the duties which it enjoins, rather than according toparticular virtues ; thus, 1. Our duties towards God ; as piety,reverence, resignation, &c. 2. Our duties towards other men,that is, our relative duties; as justice, charity, fidelity, &c.

* Cicero de Officiis, Lib. I. c. 5; Lib. II. c. 9. Smith’s Moral Sentiments,Vol. II. p. 68.

t See Euripides’ Medea, 635, 636. Smith’s Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 68.

t Idem, Vol. II. pp. 67, 68. § Cicero de Officiis, Lib. I. c. 19.

|| Smith’s Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 68.