DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

No particular division of a subject is otherwise important thanas it is natural, suited to the subject, sufficiently comprehensive,and contributes to perspicuity and order of arrangement. Tosecure these ends, writers on moral philosophy have used severaldivisions, suited to the particular views of the science, whichthey have taken themselves, and have wished to communicate totheir readers.

By one ancient division, practical morals were divided intobenevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. “ Benevo-lence,” says Dr. Paley, “ proposes good ends ; prudence sug-gests the best means of attaining them ; fortitude enables us toencounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements whichstand in our way in pursuit of these ends ; temperance repelsand overcomes the passions that obstruct it. Benevolence, forinstance, prompts us to undertake the cause of an oppressed or-phan ; prudence suggests the best means of doing it; fortitudeenables us to confront the danger, and bear up against the loss,disgrace, or repulse that may attend our undertaking ; and tem-perance keeps under the love of money, ease, or amusement,which might divert us from it.” *

By another ancient division, virtue was divided into twobranches, prudence and benevolence,—prudence consisting inattention to our own interest, benevolence in a regard for theinterests of our fellow-men. The ancient moralists regardedprudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice, as the cardinal vir-tues. But they used these terms with a latitude of meaning quiteunknown to them at the present time.

By wisdom, among the ancients, was understood universalknowledge of things human and divine ; f while prudence (ygorrjais)was said to consist in a knowledge of things proper to be desired,or to be avoided.^: Prudence, therefore, differed from wisdom,as a part differs from a whole. Prudence, moreover, with them,

* Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 25.

t Cicero de Officiis, Lib. I. c. 43. I Idem, Lib. I. c. 43; Lib. III. c. 17.