Chap. VII.] IMMORAL INFLUENCE OF SKEPTICISM.

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foundation of morals. It may be assumed as a maxim, that noperson can be required to act contrary to his greatest good, orhis highest interest, comprehensively viewed in relation to thewhole duration of his being. It is often our duty to forego ourown interest partially; to sacrifice a smaller pleasure for the sakeof a greater ; to incur a present evil in pursuit of a distant good ofmore consequence. In a word, to arbitrate among interferingclaims of inclination, is the moral arithmetic of human life. Butto risk the happiness of the whole duration of our being, in anycase whatever, would be foolish, were it possible; because thesacrifice must, by the nature of it, be so great as to preclude thepossibility of compensation.

As the present world, on skeptical principles, is the only placeof recompense, whenever the practice of virtue fails to promisethe greatest sum of present good, cases which often occur inreality, and much oftener in appearance, every motive to virtuousconduct is superseded ; a deviation from rectitude becomes thepart of wisdom ; and, should the path of virtue, in addition to this,be obstructed by disgrace, torment, or death, to persevere wouldbe madness and folly, and a violation of the first and most essen-tial law of nature. Virtue, on these principles, being in number-less instances at war with self-preservation, never can, or oughtto become a fixed habit of the mind.

The system of infidelity is not only incapable of arming virtuefor great and trying occasions, but leaves it unsupported in themost ordinary occurrences. In vain will its advocates appeal toa moral sense, to benevolence, and sympathy; for it is unde-niable, that these impulses may be overcome. In vain will theyexpatiate on the tranquillity and pleasure attendant on a virtuouscourse ; for, though you may remind the offender, that in disre-garding them he has violated his nature, and that a conduct con-sistent with them is productive of much internal satisfaction ; yetif he replies that his taste is of a different sort, that there areother gratifications which he values more, and that every manmust choose his own pleasures, the argument is at an end. Re-wards and punishments, assigned by infinite power, afford a pal-pable and pressing motive, which can never be neglected without