214

THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF MANKIND.

[Part III.

CHAPTER V.I.

OBSERVANCE OF CONTRACTS.

A contract has been defined to be, the assent of two ormore minds to the same thing. The minds of both parties, it issaid, must be brought to act upon the same subject-matter, andmust concur in opinion respecting it. But by a definition bettersuited to my purpose, because more easily applied, and capableof a more distinct and easy analysis, a contract is a mutual prom-ise. Hence, contracts, in respect to their obligation, to the sensein which they are to be interpreted, and the cases in which theyare not binding, are subject to the same rules as promises.

From the principles before established, that the obligation ofpromises is to be measured by the expectation which the prorn-iser in any way, voluntarily and knowingly, excites,* results therule, which (in foro conscientim) governs the construction of allcontracts, and which is capable, from its simplicity, of being ap-plied with great ease and certainty ; to wit, that whatever is ex-pected by one party , and lenown to be so expected by the other ,is to be deemed a part or condition of the contract, f But ascontracts are so much more the object of municipal law, than ofmoral philosophy, I shall not dwell much upon them. A fewgeneral observations, however, relative to the connexion betweenlaw and morals, and their respective bearing on each other, so faras this subject is concerned, may be useful.

1. There is a gratifying and instructive coincidence betweenthe rules of Christian morals, and the rules and doctrines of thelaw, in regard to contracts. “No man can be heard in a court ofjustice, to enforce a contract founded in, or arising from, moral orpolitical turpitude.” Again, “ As far as it can be enforced byhuman sanctions, the rule of the municipal law is identical withthe golden precept taught by Christianity, of doing to others as

See pp. 202, 204.

t Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 83.