Chap. V.]

OBSERVANCE OF PROMISES.

211

decides the question the other way,* and attempts to separate theobligation to perform the promise, from the criminal affectionwhich prompted it, and from the immoral tendency of the trans-action. But it seems to me, that the subject-matter, the motivesof the parties, and the general tendency, character, and circum-stances of the entire transaction, ought to be viewed in connexionwith the question of the performance of the 'promise, and as in-separable from it. If so, the opinion of Bishop Sanderson mustbe sustained. All the considerations of public policy are onthe side of Bishop Sanderson’s decision ; and this is further evi-dence of its soundness. For, considerations of public policy, andthe principles of good morals, always coincide, when both are view-ed in all their connexions, tendencies, and influences.!

A promise cannot be deemed immoral, where it produces,when performed, no effect beyond what would have taken place,had the promise never been made. And this is the single case,in which the obligation of a promise will justify a course of con-duct, which, unless it had been promised, would have been un-justifiable. A captive may rightfully recover his freedom by apromise of neutrality ; for his conqueror gains nothing by thepromise, which he might not have secured by his confinement;and neutrality will be innocent in him, although unjustifiable inanother. It is manifest, however, that promises which are sub-stituted in the place of coercion, can extend no further than topassive compliances, for coercion itself could compel no more.

Upon the same principle, promises of secrecy, in certain cases,ought not to be violated, although the public might derive ad-vantage from the disclosure. Such promises contain nothingin them which ought to destroy or impair their obligation ; for,as the information would not have been imparted upon any othercondition, the public lose nothing by the promise, which theywould have gained without it. This applies to the relation sub-

* Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 78.

t The views contained in this paragraph are fully sustained by the analogiesof the purest branches of the law. See Story on “ Constructive Fraud,” in his“ Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,” pp. 290 - 324. And again, in his“Conflict of Laws,” pp. 204, 209,210,213 - 215. This learned author seemsto omit no fair occasion to bring into notice and enforce the morals of the law.