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THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF MANKIND. [Part III.

therefore none can be disappointed. But, in case I declare myintention to a third person, who, without any authority from me,conveys my declaration to the promisee, —• is that such a noticeas will be binding on me ? Assuredly it is not; for I have notdone that which constitutes the essence of a promise. I havenot voluntarily excited expectation.*

4. A promise is not binding, where it is inconsistent with aprevious promise. Dr. Rutherforth illustrates this position thus ;“ When we have once alienated a part of our liberty,” sayshe, “ it is not our own to dispose of again ; when we have givenone man a demand upon us to act in a particular manner, we haveparted with our liberty in this respect, and cannot give anotherman a demand upon us to act in a contrary manner. What ishere said of promises, is equally true of all other sorts of volun-tary obligations. Any former obligation takes aw'ay the libertyof the person who is engaged in it; and, where he has no liberty,he can do no act which will be valid, and consequently nonewhich can be binding upon him. Indeed, upon any other suppo-sition, there would be no such thing as any possibility of a man’sbeing obliged at all by his own act ; which in morality is deemedan absurdity. For, if a second obligation could make void thefirst, then a third might make void the second, and a fourth mightmake void the third, and so on without end.”f If this illustra-tion is rather technical, still it is perfectly sound, and is valuablefor its extensive application.

5. Erroneous promises are not binding in certain cases.

(1.) Where the error proceeds from the mistake or misrepre-sentation of the promisee. The reason of this is, that a promiseevidently supposes the truth of the statement, which the promiseemakes, in order to obtain it. A beggar solicits your alms by astory of the most pitiable distress ; you promise to relieve himif he will call again ; but in the interval you discover his storyto be false ; this discovery, no doubt, releases you from yourpromise. Again, one who w T ants your services, describes theoffice or business for which he wishes to engage you, and youpromise to undertake it; when, however, you come to enter

* Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 79.

t Institutes of Natural Law, p. 91.