204

THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF MANKIND. [Part 111.

ance comes, unless it shall be as convenient to him to make itgood as it was at the time of promising. But such a tacit con-dition as this, if the promiser is allowed to explain it, will put itin his power either to be bound or not bound by his promise,according to his own good pleasure. For it is next to impossi-ble, that the circumstances of any man should continue so exactlythe same, as not to furnish him, on this ground, with a pretext toevade his promise, between the time of promising and the timeof performance. Besides, it would be absurd to suppose a con-dition to be tacitly annexed to any obligation, which is of such akind as to leave the obligation to the discretion of the partyobliged. *

But promises are made every day and almost every hour; —all the minutiae of time, place, and circumstance cannot alwaysbe distinctly expressed, and, where nothing of much importanceis depending on them, implied conditions may well be admitted.How many promises are made every day in the unqualified form,which, however, it is well understood, will be performed or neg-lected, according as our health at the time may permit or pre-vent, or according as the weather and other circumstances overwhich we have no control, may be favorable or unfavorable.Moreover, the cases in which promises are not binding, whichare to be reviewed and illustrated under the next division, mustbe understood as implied conditions of every promise.

The general and governing principle applicable not only topromises, but also to a mere declaration of intention, when such adeclaration affects another person, is, that our obligation is meas-ured by the expectations which we knowingly and voluntarilyexcite. The same principle is also applicable to our conduct.Any action or conduct of ours towards another, by which we aresensible his expectations are excited, creates an obligation onour part, which we are morally bound to satisfy and fulfil. Tak-ing, for instance, a kinsman’s child, and educating him for a libe-ral profession, or in a manner suitable only for the heir of a largefortune, puts a man under the same moral obligation to place himin such a profession, or to leave him such a fortune, as if he had

Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natural Law, p. 92.