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THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF MANKIND. [Part III.

intentions in practice. This additional declaration,” says he,“does not confer any perfect right upon the person in whosefavor it is made, nor give him any strict demand upon him whomade it. But it strengthens vastly his obligation to make hisdesigns good ; both because it would be an instance of greaterlevity to change what seems to have been thus firmly and unal-terably resolved upon ; and because a disappointment, to thosewho are made to expect his favors, will be so much more hurt-ful, in proportion as their expectations were raised higher.”Again, continues he, “ when a man not merely declares hispresent intentions to another, in reference to some future gift orservice, with satisfactory indications of his being in earnest, andof his being resolved with himself to continue in the same mind ;but, further, makes known his design to give him a right to de-mand such gift or service hereafter , — it is a promise.”*Here, however, as sometimes elsewhere, this valuable writerdraws a line of distinction where there is not much difference.

When the terms of a promise admit of more senses than one,the promise is to be performed in that sense in which the prom-iser apprehended at the time that the promisee received it. Itis very certain, that the rightful interpretation of a promise is notalways the same in which the promiser intended to perform it,when making it. An equivocal promise may be made the meansof the most cruel deception. For instance, Mahomet, Emperorof the Turks, at the taking of Negropont, having promised a manto spare his head, caused him to be cut in two, through themiddle of the body. Tamerlane, after having engaged the cityof Sebasta to capitulate, under the promise of causing no bloodto be spilt, caused all the soldiers of the garrison to be buriedalive.f These barbarian conquerors fulfilled their promises in onesense, and in the sense too, in which they intended at the timeof making them ; but not in the sense in which the promiseesactually received them, nor in the sense in which they them-selves knew that the promisees received them ; which last sense,according to the rule I am illustrating, was the sense in whichthey were in conscience bound to perform them.

* Institutes of Natural Law, Chap. XII. 1, 2.t Quoted by Vattel, Law of Nations, p. 313.