WILLIAM THE THIRD.

163

deceive those who imagined that the great antagonist ofthe House of Bourbon could he so weak as to lay the liber-ties of Europe at the feet of that house. A King of Francewould, by acquiring territories in the South of Italy, havereally hound himself over to keep the peace; for, as soonas he was at war with his neighbours, those territories werecertain to be worse than useless to him. They werehostages at the mercy of his enemies. It would he easy toattack them. It would be hardly possible to defend them.A French army sent to them by land would have to forceits way through the passes of the Alps, through Piedmont,through Tuscany, and through the Pontifical States, inopposition probably to great German armies. A Frenchfleet would run great risk of being intercepted and de-stroyed by the squadrons of England and Holland. Of allthis Lewis was perfectly aware. He repeatedly declaredthat he should consider the kingdom of the Two Sicilies as asource, not of strength, but of weakness. He accepted itfit last with murmurs: he seems to have intended to makeit over to one of his younger grandsons; and he would be-yond all doubt have gladly given it in exchange for a thir-tieth part of the same area in the Netherlands.* But in the

* I will quote from the despatches of Lewis to Tallard three orfour passages which show that the value of the kingdom of the TwoSicilies was quite justly appreciated at Versailles. “A l’egard duroyaumo de Naples et de Sicilo le roi d’Angletcrre objcctera (pie lesplaces do cos utats entre mes mains me rendront maitre du commercede la Mediteranee. Vous pourrez en ce cas laisser entendre, comraede vous memo, qu’il serait si difficile de conscrvcr ces royaumes unis a

11 *

CHAP.

XXIV.

1 tilts.